The comments on the war between Israel and Hamas tend to be a speed for the defense in favor, making morals for or against Israel. It is a very important debate but it is not only. There is also the need for a calm strategic evaluation: who is gaining, which is losing?

English original version: Israel' S Incompetence in Gaza French Amendment:

supports that the Hamas (which it calls “a small isolated movement that control a small tape”) really very badly calculated by waking up the hostility of the Egyptian government and by making the war in Israel. He concludes that Hamas embarked in a “strategic suicide”.

Perhaps, but of the scenarios exist in which Hamas gains. Khaled notes the support powerful and growing for Hamas, in the Middle East.

Caroline notes the two ways by which Hamas gains: a return to the status quo handle, with the Hamas which remains in charge of the Gaza Strip, or an agreement of cease-fire by which the foreign powers form an international regime of monitoring to supervise the borders of Gaza with Israel and Egypt.

As this suggests it, a report on the evaluation of the war of Hamas depends primarily on the decisions taken with Jérusalem. Did these decisions being the true question, how Israel carry out the leadership?

In a disastrous way. The deep strategic incompetence of Jerusalem continues and strengthens the failure of the policies since 1993 which eroded the reputation, the strategic advantage and the security of Israel.

Four primary reasons lead me to this negative conclusion.

Initially, the team in charge with Jérusalem created the problem of Gaza. Its chief, the prime minister in an immortal way explained in 2005 the next Israeli unilateral withdrawal of Gaza: “Us (Israelis), we are tired to fight, we are tired to be courageous, we are tired to gain, we are tired to overcome our enemies”.

has a vital role by starting the withdrawal of the Gaza Strip which put an end to control Israeli defense forces on the territory and while giving up with the control of Israel on the border between Gaza and Egypt.

The latter, little noted decision, made it possible Hamas to build tunnels towards Egypt, to make smuggling of hardware, and launching missiles on Israel.

Secondly, and its colleagues failed to answer the barrage of rockets and mortar shell. Since the Israeli withdrawal in 2005 until now, Hamas launched more than 6.issiles on Israel.

As incredible as that can appear, the Israelis underwent nearly eight attacks per day during three years. Why? A responsible government would have answered the first rocket like a and would have immediately reacted.

Thirdly, a committee of French Parliament published an important report mid-December, establishing that “there is no more doubt” in connection with the military objectives of the Iranian nuclear program, and that it would be in place in the 2-3 years.

The period of decline of the bush administration with the current chairman close to the gate and the elected chairman still behind-the-scene, offers one single moment to take care of the businesses. Why did it waste this occasion to confront the relatively unimportant danger which Hamas forwards rather than the existential threat of the Iranian nuclear program? This negligence can have tragic repercussions.

Lastly, from what one can distinguish of the objective of the government, in his war against Hamas, it seems to be to weaken Hamas and to strengthen Fatah so that Mahmoud Abbas can take again the control of Gaza and reboot the diplomacy with Israel. Michael B and took this idea in a recent item entitled “the Palestinians require that Israel gains: if Hamas fires some with terror once more, the peace process will be finished.”

The bitter experiment, however, invalid this thesis. one, Fatah proved to be an enemy determined with the intention to eliminate the Jewish State. For another, the Palestinians themselves denounced Fatah in the elections of 2006. It puts at severely tested the fact that somebody can still accept Fatah like “a partner for peace”.

On the contrary, Jerusalem was to think in a creative way of other scenarios, perhaps my “solution of not-State” introducing the governments Jordanian and Egyptian.

More still dismaying that the incompetence of is that the elections in Israel of there is one month from now three management of the same quality opposes. Two of them (the Foreign Minister and the Minister for Defense ) currently are useful like its main lieutenants, while two ( and Benjamin Netanyahu) seriously failed in their preliminary firm of prime minister.

Beyond potential and its successors it there at worst the news of all, namely that no one at the higher levels of the political life does not express the imperative need for the victory. For this reason I see Israel like a lost State, full with talent, energy and decision but lack management.