| On March 26, 2007, the Arab League declared "that | | | | by the Arab League, The Organization of Islamic |
| the Iraqi Government should be a national | | | | Conference (OIC), and the United Nations. The |
| government for all Iraqis - a real national unity | | | | visibility offered by such a role would give the Arab |
| government - and respecting the will of the Iraqi | | | | League and OIC a vested stake in Iraq's future. It |
| people in all its components to decide their political | | | | would also undermine rejectionist arguments that the |
| future." On May 2, 2007, the U.S. Commission on | | | | United States or West imposed a solution on Iraq |
| International Religious Freedom put Iraq on its watch | | | | and, therefore, the new Iraqi government lacked |
| list for violators explaining that "the Iraqi government | | | | legitimacy. |
| has engaged in human rights violations through its | | | | The conference's hosts, the United States, Iraq's |
| state security forces, including arbitrary arrest, | | | | neighbors, and all of the factions enjoying appreciable |
| prolonged detention without due process, extrajudicial | | | | support within Iraq (excepting only the Al Qaeda |
| executions, and torture" and "the Iraqi government | | | | terrorist organization) would participate. They would |
| tolerates religiously based attacks and other religious | | | | work out a political framework that ensures basic |
| freedom abuses carried out by armed Shi'a factions | | | | protections for all of Iraq's peoples, facilitates the |
| including the Jaysh al-Mehdi (Mahdi Army) and the | | | | establishment of an inclusive interim government that |
| Badr Organization." In a U.S. Congress in which almost | | | | represents all factions, and creates a |
| every opportunity to find disagreement between the | | | | quasi-governmental corporation that controls Iraq's oil |
| Democrats and Republicans is seemingly exploited | | | | resources and in which every Iraqi holds shares. Once |
| with an efficiency that would make corporate "Six | | | | the interim government is created, all armed groups |
| Sigma" programs appear wasteful in comparison, both | | | | would be folded into common Iraqi security and |
| sides have joined together to condemn the Iraqi | | | | armed forces, a regional national guard similar to the |
| parliament's plans to recess this July without their | | | | state-based model in the U.S., or disarmed. Iraq's |
| having approved national reconciliation and oil-sharing | | | | former military personnel and civil servants would |
| legislation. Considering that Iraq's present government | | | | either return to service or receive pensions. |
| is a sectarian government dedicated to advancing | | | | This economic rehabilitation/pension program would |
| sectarian interests, such developments in Iraq are not | | | | reintegrate a sizable number of people back into Iraqi |
| surprising. | | | | society and give them a meaningful stake in that |
| More such developments are likely in the absence of | | | | society's future. For a rough estimate of possible |
| a legitimate national Iraqi government. Continuing | | | | costs, if one took the highest estimate of Iraq's |
| absence of a legitimate national government will inhibit | | | | prewar military/reserves personnel (1.7 million |
| efforts to stabilize Iraq, much less put it on a path | | | | members) and offered each member an income |
| toward sustainable self-governance. An approach that | | | | pension equivalent to Iraq's per capita GDP ($2,000), |
| winds up mainly advancing Shia aspirations for | | | | the program's costs would amount to about $3.4 |
| dominance is not a recipe for building a stable Iraq. | | | | billion per year. In comparison, current U.S. costs in |
| Maintaining or tightening existing Sunni economic and | | | | Iraq are running at approximately $2 billion per week |
| political disenfranchisement will push Iraq further | | | | and these former military personnel and civil servants |
| down the violent path of fragmentation. Continuing | | | | have little stake in supporting a society from which |
| instability will create additional avenues by which | | | | they have been largely excluded. |
| outside actors, particularly Iran, Syria, and Al Qaeda, | | | | A pilot program that offers Iraqi youth financial |
| can stymie Iraq's evolution and threaten critical U.S. | | | | incentives to renounce extremism and abandon |
| regional interests. | | | | extremist groups could also be put in place. In Saudi |
| Considering the damage the sectarian government in | | | | Arabia, such a program directed at imprisoned |
| Baghdad has already inflicted, the role it has played in | | | | extremist youth has proved promising. Dr. Muhammad |
| perpetuating and exacerbating historic sectarian | | | | Al-Najimi, a member of the counseling committee |
| differences, and the consequences of maintaining | | | | that runs this program, explained, "80%-90% or even |
| such a government, it would serve Iraq's, the United | | | | more [of the more than 1,000 youth who have |
| States's, and the Middle East's interests if that | | | | participated in the program to date] have given up |
| government were replaced by a legitimate one | | | | their extremist views..." Given the danger presented |
| comprised of all of Iraq's peoples and dedicated to | | | | by extremist groups seeking to exploit the current |
| serving all Iraqis. The biggest issue concerning Iraq is | | | | situation in Iraq, an investment in such a program |
| not whether the government headed by Nouri | | | | might well provide a firewall of sorts that minimizes |
| al-Maliki should go--it should--but how to bring about | | | | the growth of such groups during Iraq's transitional |
| the legitimate national government Iraq urgently | | | | period. |
| needs. | | | | Iraq's existing Parliament would be asked to ratify |
| Although the U.S. and Iraq's neighbors cannot dissolve | | | | the political settlement and new interim government, |
| Iraq's present government, they can present | | | | so as to avoid having to build Iraq's political |
| incentives that would be attractive to Iraq's people | | | | architecture from scratch. Such a vote would be a |
| and to a sufficient number of members of parliament | | | | mere formality, as the U.S., Iraq's neighbors, and |
| to cause the Maliki government to fall and invite the | | | | Iraq's factions would have worked beforehand to win |
| formation of a new Iraqi government. Such incentives | | | | the commitment of a sufficient number of |
| would include substantial reconstruction assistance, | | | | Parliamentarians to assure the outcome. |
| the elimination of most of Iraq's foreign debt, a | | | | At this time, the odds of such a pragmatic approach |
| financial mechanism to pay Iraq's former military | | | | are low. Neoconservative ideologues in Washington |
| personnel and civil servants (except for the senior | | | | already hail Iraq as a "young democracy." They |
| most Ba'athist officials), and an opening of markets | | | | remain almost delusional to the reality that the |
| to Iraq's goods contingent on the adoption of a | | | | current government in Baghdad is sectarian, not |
| political settlement that makes a national government | | | | national. They remain mired in a fantasy in which they |
| possible and the formation of that government. | | | | believe others, not themselves, do not understand |
| The combination of a "regional concert" in the Middle | | | | "what's really happening in Iraq." |
| East (Iraq's neighbors and the United States) and an | | | | Nevertheless, with each passing day, the |
| international conference modeled after that held in | | | | neoconservative foreign policy school is further |
| Bonn in December 2001 to create a transitional | | | | discredited. Iraq, the very first grand neoconservative |
| government in Afghanistan offers perhaps the most | | | | foreign policy project, is sliding further toward failed |
| viable route for achieving such an outcome. In the | | | | state status. "This thing is really coming undone |
| regional concert, the parties would commit to using | | | | quickly," Senator Chuck Hagel observed upon his |
| their influence to bring Iraq's factions together in the | | | | returning from Iraq at the end of April. A Congress |
| aforementioned political conference, recognizing the | | | | that is determined to bring about a better outcome |
| new Iraqi government that would emerge, helping | | | | to the current situation in Iraq could bolster |
| curb the flow of arms and armed elements into Iraq, | | | | prospects for such an outcome by abandoning its |
| and providing the economic assistance and trade | | | | fruitless quest for military withdrawal timelines and |
| incentives that would make it possible for Iraq to | | | | instead throwing its support behind a political |
| achieve robust and sustained economic growth. | | | | approach that would bring about a legitimate national |
| The international conference could be hosted jointly | | | | government in Iraq. |