| To be truly effective, a strategic plan has to embody | | | | underestimated the passion and the commitment of |
| certain key elements. First, and foremost, the plan | | | | the enemy ground forces. The number of enemy |
| has to be based on a vision -- that is, a vision what | | | | combatants also was underestimated with the influx |
| success looks like. This element is the cornerstone of | | | | of Chinese combatants. |
| an effective plan, and it applies to the military as well | | | | So here we are more than fifty years later, Korea is |
| as to business. | | | | still divided geographically and philosophically at the |
| In Barry Ritholtz' book "The Bailout Nation," he quotes | | | | 38th parallel, and North Korea still remains a threat to |
| Bob Algern, the former counsel for BP Amoco | | | | world peace. |
| regarding a "key lesson from history: We should pay | | | | Now let us take a brief look at what transpired in |
| head to the sheer number of empires that became | | | | Vietnam. While not all of the same factors that |
| overstretched militarily and then sunk under their own | | | | affected Korea were present in Vietnam, there |
| weight. We need a military and intelligence system | | | | certainly are some similarities. The military and the |
| structured for the next century, not the last one. | | | | Washington politicians were in constant conflict. In |
| And just as important, we need to be able to size | | | | fact, reports back to Washington misrepresented the |
| these endeavors at a level we can afford. We can't | | | | facts by design in an attempt to get what the |
| continue to subsidize the entire free world by acting | | | | military perceived as necessary to winning the |
| as the globe's policeman." | | | | conflict. As with Korea, the US believed that their |
| By the same token, if we decide to get involved | | | | technical superiority would overwhelm the enemy. |
| anywhere in the world, it would appear that the | | | | The approach was to "search and destroy" enemy |
| military strategy would need to be predicated on | | | | forces, primarily by bombing. Another implication of |
| "winning" in the sense of turning around a dangerous | | | | this approach was that insufficient troops committed |
| or untenable situation. It also would appear that | | | | to the battlefield. The net result was a significant |
| history could provide many "lessons learned" that | | | | number of casualties and a civilian population that |
| would enable the military strategists to avoid some | | | | became more sympathetic to the enemy. |
| of the mistakes made in prior conflicts. | | | | In contrast, the dedication and commitment of the |
| Looking at what has transpired, and what is | | | | enemy ground forces, along with their ability to gain |
| continuing to take place in Iraq and in Afghanistan, | | | | the support of the civilian population, was |
| raises some serious questions as to whether any of | | | | underestimated. The US tactic of heavy bombing |
| the history lessons have been taken into | | | | only served to unite the Vietnamese people. Finally, |
| consideration. Looking at what transpired in Korea | | | | many of the people in the US were openly against |
| and in Vietnam, and the eventual outcomes in both | | | | the war which not only was demoralizing to the US |
| of those "wars," one could conclude that we continue | | | | troops and may have served to further embolden |
| to follow the same path and could end up with similar | | | | the enemy. |
| outcomes. | | | | In this case, the US left with no victory and no |
| Let us first look at what transpired in Korea and | | | | resolution of the issue that caused them to enter the |
| some of the factors that led to a situation with no | | | | war in the first place. It was a forfeit, and indicated |
| satisfactory conclusion and with no resolution after | | | | the possibility that the US could not be counted on |
| over fifty years of stalemate. First of all, primarily as | | | | to defend its allies. |
| a result of budget cuts, a mere five years after the | | | | Now here we are in the Middle East. Have we learned |
| conclusion of World War II, the US military was not | | | | from our prior mistakes or are we repeating them? |
| well armed or well trained. Secondly, there were | | | | Have politics and public opinion gotten enmeshed in |
| serious command issues. President Truman and | | | | military planning? Have we underestimated the |
| General MacArthur shared a severe dislike for one | | | | passion and commitment of the enemy? Do we have |
| another making politics an even bigger component of | | | | any indication of the number of enemy combatants |
| the military equation than normal. Third, the US | | | | we face? Have we relied too much on "technical |
| believed that their technical superiority (i.e. air and sea | | | | superiority?" Do we have sufficient forces with their |
| power) would overwhelm the enemy and result in a | | | | feet on the ground to fight the war we are in? |
| quick victory. As a result insufficient numbers of | | | | When will our real allies recognize that "we can't |
| troops were committed to the ground where the | | | | continue to subsidize the entire free world by acting |
| real battles were to be fought. Fourth, the US | | | | as the globe's policeman? |