| bly, no President in history has received a legendary | | | | discuss certain matters in areas that British soldiers or |
| status equal to George Washington. His reputation as | | | | spies were able to overhear, or even to intercept |
| a gifted military leader stems partially from his unique | | | | messages meant for British forces and alter them |
| perspective as the leader of counterinsurgency | | | | before passing them along seemingly unchanged. For |
| forces (as a young officer in the Seven | | | | example: When Washington had his army outside of |
| Year’s War) and as the leader of an | | | | Philadelphia he instructed his procurement officers |
| insurgent army (in the Revolutionary War). | | | | make sizable purchases of supplies, and even |
| Within OPSEC circles, Washington is often quoted as | | | | constructed fake military facilities, which convinced |
| saying, "Even minutiae should have a place in our | | | | the British that his 3,000-strong army contained |
| collection, for things of a seemingly trifling nature, | | | | 40,000 men. |
| when enjoined with others of a more serious cast, | | | | Throughout the war, Washington relied heavily on |
| may lead to valuable conclusion." While this is certainly | | | | espionage and intelligence. The Culper Spy Ring, |
| true you must understand that this is a lesson our | | | | headed by Major Benjamin Talmadge (under the |
| first president learned through bitter, near fatal | | | | pseudonym “John Bolton”) learned |
| experience. | | | | that the British had plans to attack an allied French |
| Washington’s first experience with OPSEC (a | | | | expedition in Rhode Island (it is not clear how British |
| term not used at the time, but the principles remain | | | | Forces learned of the landing). Washington responded |
| the same) came at the age of 21 when he was a | | | | by planting false intelligence with British agents |
| young officer in the Seven Year’s War under | | | | indicating that he intended to move against New |
| British General Braddock. The effective French | | | | York City. In response, the British Commander held |
| intelligence network (no doubt enabled by ineffective | | | | his forces at New York, which had the additional |
| security) was able to ascertain Braddock’s | | | | benefit of masking Washington’s movement |
| moves well in advance and successfully ambushed | | | | towards Chesapeake Bay and Yorktown. It was |
| the combined British and Colonial forces on their first | | | | imperative that Washington’s forces practice |
| expedition. In this attack, the combined forces lost | | | | good OPSEC in order to avoid detection of this grand |
| 615 of their officers and 914 soldiers; in addition | | | | deception. |
| General Braddock was mortally wounded and barely | | | | Washington understood the importance of educating |
| escaped with the aid of Washington. Before his death | | | | those under him about what we’ve come to |
| four days later, Braddock gave Washington his | | | | call OPSEC. In a clear early understanding of what we |
| ceremonial sash, one of the two reminders of this | | | | now know as the OPSEC process, Washington wrote |
| lesson that would stay with him forever. | | | | to thank James Lovell for a piece of intelligence, |
| If this hard lesson taught Washington one thing, it | | | | saying, “it is by comparing a variety of |
| was the necessity of effective intelligence, as well as | | | | information, we are frequently enabled to investigate |
| that of secrecy. He was later quoted as saying, | | | | facts, which were so intricate or hidden, that no |
| “(U)pon Secrecy, Success depends in Most | | | | single clue could have led to the knowledge of them.. |
| Enterprises…and for want of it, they are | | | | . intelligence becomes interesting which but from its |
| generally defeated.” | | | | connection and collateral circumstances, would not be |
| With this philosophy, Washington would establish and | | | | important." He also spoke to General Rufus Putnam in |
| lead an effective spy network during the | | | | August 1777 about calculating an adversary’s |
| Revolutionary War. These spies would operate, at | | | | strength, saying, "Deserters and people of that class |
| times, directly with or under British forces and would | | | | always speak of number.. . indeed, scarce any person |
| provide Washington with critical military information | | | | can form a judgment unless he sees the troops |
| regarding British plans, strategies and objectives. In | | | | paraded and can count the divisions. But, if you can |
| order to evade detection, all agents would memorize | | | | by any means obtain a list of the regiments left upon |
| and refer only to code names (for instance, George | | | | the island, we can compute the number of men |
| Washington was only referred to as | | | | within a few hundreds, over or under." This |
| “711” and New York was | | | | “training” prompted Federalist William |
| “727”), which demonstrates a clear | | | | Duer to write, “To say more in a Letter, |
| understanding of the importance of obfuscating key | | | | might be imprudent” when discussing a matter |
| names and locations. Using the same scheme for | | | | of potential value. |
| names and locations also helped to hide their true | | | | Similarly, to the credit of the Continental Congress, |
| meaning. In addition, the use of secret codes, invisible | | | | the first secrecy agreement was adopted for |
| ink and encryption demonstrated | | | | government employees. It read, in part, "I do |
| Washington’s awareness of the necessity of | | | | solemnly swear, that I will not directly or indirectly |
| not only attempting to avoid the capture of | | | | divulge any manner or thing which shall come to my |
| information, but also to prevent the use of | | | | knowledge as (clerk, secretary) of the board of War |
| information should capture occur. | | | | and Ordnance for the United Colonies.. . So help me |
| Unfortunately, this valuable lesson seemed to be | | | | God." |
| forgotten when Washington sent a seemingly | | | | Perhaps the best example of OPSEC in |
| harmless letter to his dentist in Philadelphia asking for | | | | Washington’s strategy was in the attack on |
| denture wires and a cleaning tool. In and of itself, this | | | | Stony Point. Stony Point was an ominous British fort |
| letter provided no military intelligence of value when it | | | | on the Hudson River, with walls 150 feet high, water |
| and other messages were captured by the British. | | | | on three sides and a swamp on the fourth, and an |
| However, some of the other messages indicated a | | | | imposing garrison of 500 men and many cannons. |
| potential attack on New York. Sir Henry Clinton, then | | | | Colonel Wayne was convinced that it could be taken, |
| chief of the British Army, was skeptical. The letters | | | | and eventually convinced Washington that it could be |
| almost seemed too good to be true especially when | | | | done. Washington approved the plan with the advice, |
| you understand that Washington’s skill in | | | | "That is should be attempted by the Light Infantry |
| military deception was known by the enemy. Clinton | | | | only, which should march under cover of the night |
| was left to wonder of the validity and value of the | | | | and with the utmost secrecy to the enemy's lines, |
| “intelligence.” However, Clinton | | | | securing every person they find to prevent |
| correctly reasoned that this letter would most likely | | | | discovery”. Note especially the use of |
| not have been included in a package was to be | | | | darkness to mask movement and the securing of |
| intentionally “captured” and surmised | | | | potential witnesses/agents. Because of this secrecy, |
| that the captured intelligence was legitimate. Clinton | | | | the surprise attack was a success resulting in only 15 |
| was able to strengthen his forces in New York, | | | | American deaths versus 63 British. |
| prompting Washington to abandon that campaign. | | | | Clearly, George Washington effectively led the newly |
| This setback did not discourage Washington from | | | | formed army to victory not only because of |
| continuing to use deception and disinformation | | | | excellent military tactics, but also because a solid |
| however. This lesson learned became a very | | | | understanding of OPSEC. If OPSEC can help General |
| effective strategy to fabricate documents to be | | | | Washington win a war then who are we to deny its |
| “captured”, or to instruct agents to | | | | use today to protect our sensitive information? |